By Sardar Khan Niazi

When history recalls the signature of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, between India and Pakistan under the aegis of the World Bank, it will mark it as one of the most remarkable peace‑time mechanisms for sharing trans‑boundary water resources. It survived two wars, the Kargil episode, and decades of mistrust. Yet today it stands in limbo, possibly on the brink of collapse, and Pakistan must now face the prospect that an agreement upon which 80 per cent of its irrigated agriculture depends may slip into history. In April 2025, India announced that it would hold the IWT in abeyance following a terrorist attack in Indian‑administered Kashmir that Delhi attributed to Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the move as a violation of international law and warned that any interference with its waters would amount to an act of war. The western rivers–the Indus River, Jhelum River, and Chenab River– flow largely from Indian‑administered territory into Pakistan. Under the IWT, Pakistan enjoys unrestricted use of these rivers, while India’s use is restricted to limited conditions. By suspending the treaty unilaterally, India is signaling it no longer accepts the status quo. Pakistani farmers are already voicing fears that water flows or flood‑notification data may be withheld. From Pakistan’s perspective, the IWT does not provide any allowance for unilateral suspension. The pact was designed precisely to forestall water becoming yet another weapon in the adversarial toolbox between the two neighbors. Islamabad argues that India’s withdrawal undermines the credibility of every treaty it signs, and invites retaliation beyond the water domain. Pakistan must realize that this is not simply a legal spat. By putting the treaty in abeyance, India opens the possibility of withholding upstream flood‑notifications, delaying water releases during sowing seasons, or accelerating hydroelectric projects without the transparency that the IWT envisaged. Experts warn that infrastructure cannot be built overnight—and indeed India lacks capacity to fully divert flows even now–but the very uncertainty is enough to unsettle Pakistan’s agrarian economy.  If the flows of the western rivers were disrupted in any substantial way, the humanitarian and economic toll for Pakistan would be immense. Pakistan must treat this not merely as a diplomatic dispute, but as a wake‑up call for water‑security reform. It needs to accelerate investment in water‑storage, groundwater recharge, and efficient irrigation technologies, so that its agriculture becomes less exposed to upstream hydropolitics. Islamabad must engage the World Bank, other riparian‑friendly states, and global institutions to highlight the systemic risk of treaty‑abrogation in the Himalayan basin. The IWT was long hailed as a model for trans‑boundary river cooperation; its unraveling merits attention beyond South Asia. While resentment is understandable, Islamabad must resist triggering escalation. Treating water retaliation as a “military” response plays into the very dynamic India may seek. Pakistan should keep dialogue channels open, stressing that the treaty is not a negotiable ornament—it is a binding agreement. Detailed, transparent records of inflows, discharges, ecological impacts, and anything suspicious upstream must be compiled. In case India proceeds to withhold data or alter flows without notice, Pakistan will need the evidentiary foundation for international legal forums. The Indus Waters Treaty was never just about irrigation or hydropower—it was a rare symbol of cooperation between two rivals. By placing it in abeyance, India has challenged not only Pakistan’s water‑security but also the integrity of treaty‑based diplomacy itself. If the swirling waters that give food to the plains of Punjab and Sindh run dry–or run unchecked–the consequences will stretch far beyond the fields. Pakistan cannot afford to treat this as another bilateral row to be kicked down the road. The future of its food‑security and rural economy may depend on acting now.