Asif Mahmood
Those who once criticized Pakistan’s concept of strategic depth should now turn their gaze toward Afghanistan, where India has been cultivating its own version of strategic depth for decades. Do they not see the danger it poses?
What is the foundation of India-Afghanistan relations? The simple answer is hostility toward Pakistan. India’s primary aim has always been to encircle Pakistan, with India pressing from the east and a Pakistan-hostile regime in Afghanistan from the west, thus keeping Pakistan engaged on both fronts.
This game began at the very birth of Pakistan. When the province of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) voted to join Pakistan rather than India, the Congress Party, at India’s behest, raised the slogan of “Pashtunistan” and encouraged Afghanistan to lay claim to the North-West Frontier region. The Durand Line narrative must be understood in this context. It was no coincidence that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations, a decision it later withdrew but not without revealing its intent.
For a long time, India used Afghanistan as a base to create problems for Pakistan. Anti-Pakistan movements operated with the full support of both Indian and Afghan leadership. India’s strategic depth in Afghanistan continued to expand. With India’s assistance, Afghan Prime Minister Hashim Khan sponsored the creation of Pashtun Zalmay, a group meant to incite unrest in Pakistan immediately after its creation, while the Afghan army would prepare to invade.
At the time, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, Sardar Najibullah, confidently declared that tribal people would soon rise, form their own assembly, and establish a government. Prime Minister Daoud Khan went so far as to establish an entire ministry dedicated to rebellion inside Pakistan and took personal charge of it himself.
In those early years, when Indian leaders were predicting that Pakistan would soon collapse and rejoin India, the Afghan leadership was a willing partner in that scheme. This, too, was part of India’s pursuit of strategic depth.
Pakistan’s own idea of strategic depth was far simpler. It was not about occupying Afghanistan or launching counterattacks from its territory. It merely sought to prevent India from succeeding in its design. Pakistan’s concern was that Afghanistan should not become a hostile neighbor, for that would leave Pakistan trapped between two enemies.
Pakistan already faces India across 2,912 kilometers of its eastern border and Afghanistan along 2,640 kilometers to the west. If both fronts turn hostile, Pakistan would be squeezed from both sides. To prevent this, Pakistan sought friendly ties with Kabul. But when Indian interference kept intensifying, Pakistan eventually had no choice but to respond.
Even today, the nature of India-Afghanistan ties remains unchanged from what it was in 1947. India is not a genuine friend of Afghanistan; it merely follows Chanakya’s maxim: befriend the neighbor of your enemy. Afghanistan, in this partnership, is only a pawn. It gains little while serving India’s proxy interests. Because of sanctions, geography, and distance, India cannot offer Afghanistan meaningful military or economic support. Afghanistan’s fruit and produce flow naturally into Pakistani markets, while trade with India through Chabahar is neither practical nor profitable.
Yes, India has funded the construction of dams on the Kabul and Kunar rivers, but this too serves a strategic goal, to reduce the flow of water into Pakistan. In other words, the same water aggression India practices directly against Pakistan, it now seeks to implement through Afghanistan.
In its partnership with India, Afghanistan gains almost nothing except the dubious honor of being used as a base for Indian proxies. Its economic interests remain directly tied to Pakistan. Yet, we have seen instances, even recently, where Afghanistan suspended trade talks with Pakistan on the grounds that India must also be included.
When, shortly after the Doha Agreement, Afghan leaders began reviving the Durand Line controversy, it became clear that peace would not last long. India will undoubtedly continue to expand its strategic depth in Afghanistan, and Pakistan cannot afford to remain indifferent. If this situation persists, the regional landscape may soon change in ways no one can ignore.