By Sardar Khan Niazi

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was conceived as a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran at a moment when the region desperately needed one. Yet the central problem confronting efforts to revive the understanding is not a shortage of diplomatic formulas. It is the profound absence of trust between the United States and Iran. Pakistan’s latest diplomatic push has at least demonstrated that the door to dialogue has not been completely closed. During Field Marshal Asim Munir’s recent meetings in Tehran, senior Iranian leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Islamabad MoU, while making clear that they expect Washington to take the first steps towards de-escalation. Tehran’s message is familiar: it believes that American pressure and military actions have undermined the very confidence required to make an agreement work. Washington, for its part, continues to rely heavily on economic pressure. The latest sanctions campaign against Iran is intended to force Tehran towards compliance, but sanctions alone cannot produce the political confidence necessary for a durable settlement. Indeed, piling on pressure at a time when Pakistan is attempting to reopen a diplomatic channel risks making the mediator’s task considerably harder.  This is where the Islamabad MoU deserves a second look. Its importance lies not merely in the commitments contained in the document but in the possibility that it can provide both sides with a structured process for moving from confrontation towards negotiation. The agreement envisaged reciprocal steps, including measures relating to hostilities, maritime access, Iranian assets and an implementation mechanism.The difficulty is that neither side appears willing to make the first concession without guarantees that the other will reciprocate.

The immediate objective should be a sequence of verifiable, reciprocal steps rather than an attempt to secure a grand bargain overnight. Each side needs to know precisely what it must do, what it will receive in return and how compliance will be independently assessed. An implementation mechanism, contemplated in the MoU itself, could become the institutional backbone of this process. The Strait of Hormuz will be particularly important. It is a global economic pressure point. Any disruption threatens energy markets far beyond the Middle East, while American military pressure around the strait feeds Tehran’s perception that its sovereignty is under direct challenge. A mutually acceptable arrangement guaranteeing the safe and predictable movement of commercial shipping could therefore serve as an early confidence-building measure. The same principle should apply to sanctions and Iranian assets. If Washington expects Tehran to alter behavior, it must demonstrate that compliance produces tangible benefits. For Pakistan, there is also a national interest at stake. A prolonged US-Iran confrontation would have consequences for regional trade, energy prices, maritime security and Pakistan’s relations with both countries. Islamabad’s mediation is therefore not an exercise in diplomatic prestige. It is an effort to prevent a conflict in Pakistan’s wider neighborhood from acquiring an even more dangerous trajectory. The recent diplomatic contacts are consequently worth preserving. Iran’s willingness to continue engaging with mediators offers an opening, however narrow. Washington should recognize that diplomacy is not a reward for Tehran; it is an instrument for protecting American interests without another costly confrontation. Tehran, likewise, must understand that sustainable relief requires credible commitments that address American and regional concerns. The Islamabad MoU provides something increasingly rare: a framework around which both sides have already shown some willingness to engage. Its revival should therefore begin with modest, reciprocal and verifiable steps. The greatest obstacle is not the absence of ideas. It is the belief in Washington and Tehran that the other side cannot be trusted. That is precisely why the first task of diplomacy should be to make trust less of a prerequisite and verification more of a substitute. If Pakistan can help the two sides move from promises to measurable actions, the Islamabad MoU may yet become more than a diplomatic footnote. It could provide the narrow pathway out of a crisis that neither Washington nor Tehran can afford to prolong indefinitely.