By Sardar Khan Niazi

The latest US-Iran exchanges, coming after months of confrontation are a grim reminder that military calm is not the same thing as peace. The danger now is that retaliation will acquire a logic of its own, making each successive escalation appear inevitable. For Pakistan, this is not a distant conflict. It is a strategic crisis unfolding in its immediate neighborhood. The renewed fighting comes as Washington has intensified economic pressure on Tehran and the security situation around the Strait of Hormuz remains precarious. Oil prices have risen sharply this week amid fears of further disruption to regional supplies.  U.S. economic pressure on Iran is intensifying, with recent sanctions and a blockade of oil exports severely impacting the Iranian economy. The latest measures have significantly hindered Iran’s ability to maintain foreign currency reserves, purchase goods, and utilize longstanding sanctions evasion tactics. The country faces a deepening economic crisis, with the Iranian rial plunging to record lows, inflation nearing 70%, and oil exports plummeting from 1.7 million barrels per day to 260,000. Iran is also contending with diminished access to international finance and disrupted trade routes, particularly through the UAE. The dwindling petrol reserves, soaring costs of imports, and collapsing labor market have heightened the risk of renewed public unrest.   U.S. Vice President JD Vance ruled out talks with Iran unless it halts attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded by expanding its list of non-compliant ships subject to penalties when passing the strait, favoring Iraqi tankers. For a country already struggling with external financing requirements, an extended energy shock would be particularly unwelcome. But economics is only one part of the Pakistani concern. Pakistan shares a border and a long historical relationship with Iran. At the same time, its political, economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are of considerable importance. Islamabad therefore has little room for the binary choices that great-power rivalries often impose. Islamabad has already invested considerable political capital in trying to bring Washington and Tehran back towards negotiations. The Foreign Office says the recent visit of Field Marshal Asim Munir to Tehran was part of efforts to facilitate an end to the conflict, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and explore a negotiated settlement. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has also reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to restraint, dialogue and sustained diplomacy.  That policy deserves to be pursued with greater urgency. Pakistan should resist the temptation to define its foreign policy through alignment with one camp. Its comparative advantage lies precisely in maintaining working relationships with competing centers of power. Its links with Washington, Tehran, Riyadh, Ankara and Beijing give it diplomatic space that many other regional states do not possess. That space should be used. There is, however, a distinction between mediation and grandstanding. Islamabad cannot end a conflict whose principal protagonists themselves remain committed to coercion. Its objective should instead be more modest and practical: keep channels of communication open, reduce the risk of miscalculation, facilitate confidence-building measures and create the conditions in which the parties can return to negotiations. The Islamabad understanding provides a useful basis for this effort. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has argued that the framework remains available even after the latest escalation and that periods of military confrontation can eventually give way to negotiations.  The crucial question is whether Washington and Tehran can recognize that neither side is likely to achieve a durable settlement through force alone. The US may possess overwhelming military superiority, but military power does not automatically translate into political outcomes. Likewise, Iran’s capacity to impose costs on US interests or disrupt shipping cannot produce the regional security it ultimately requires. The longer the confrontation continues, the greater the possibility that civilian populations, neighboring states and the global economy will bear the consequences. For Pakistan, the Strait of Hormuz is particularly significant. Any prolonged disruption would raise the cost of energy imports and place additional pressure on an already vulnerable economy.  The temptation in moments of crisis is always to think in terms of winners and losers. Pakistan should resist that temptation. A prolonged US-Iran confrontation would not produce a stable Middle East; it would deepen existing fault lines, unsettle energy markets and leave smaller states facing choices they would rather avoid. The lesson for Islamabad is therefore straightforward. Pakistan should neither become a party to the conflict nor retreat into diplomatic passivity. It should use every available channel to push for de-escalation, support the reopening of negotiations and work with regional partners to protect the freedom of navigation and the security of energy supplies.