The tragic loss of 13 soldiers in a recent suicide attack in North Waziristan’s Mir Ali is a grim reminder that terrorism continues to bleed Pakistan. Whether fuelled by external enmity or local complicity, militant violence has inflicted devastating human and economic costs. The former Fata districts, the rest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan remain especially vulnerable—Pakistan’s soft underbelly where extremist and separatist groups operate with troubling audacity.
Recent figures from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) underscore the seriousness of the threat: in May alone, 85 militant attacks claimed at least 113 lives, most of them security personnel and civilians. Such alarming statistics are unsustainable for a nation that is technically at peace. Clearly, Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy requires urgent recalibration—beyond reactive measures—toward a more proactive and holistic approach to dismantling terror networks.
The military has attributed the Mir Ali attack to a plot by “the terrorist state of India,” executed by the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or as the military terms it, “Fitna al-Khawarij.” Meanwhile, a lesser-known group, Asood al-Harb—linked to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction—has claimed responsibility. It is not unusual for militant outfits to operate under new names to evade sanctions or to fragment responsibility. What remains unchanged, however, is their shared objective to destabilise the state.
If credible evidence exists of Indian involvement, Pakistan must utilise diplomatic channels to convey its concerns unequivocally. Such evidence should also be presented at international forums, including the United Nations, to expose and counter India’s alleged destabilising agenda.
Similarly, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan must be reminded that diplomatic engagement cannot coexist with tacit support for groups like the TTP. Despite Kabul’s rejection of claims that India is misusing Afghan soil, a UN report from February clearly documented the Afghan Taliban’s continued ties with the TTP. While recent improvements in bilateral ties—facilitated by Chinese mediation—offer hope, these must translate into concrete action. Kabul’s responsibility is clear: no militant group threatening Pakistan should find sanctuary on Afghan soil.
Ultimately, the challenge is not limited to external actors alone. Strengthening our internal counterterrorism (CT) architecture is critical. The state must assert its writ across every district, ensuring that no region remains beyond its effective control. Beyond military operations, this requires investment in governance, development, and community engagement to address the conditions that militants exploit.
The blood of our soldiers and civilians demands more than statements of condemnation; it calls for sustained, strategic, and coordinated action. Terrorist groups, regardless of their shifting names or foreign patrons, must face an unyielding response. Only then can Pakistan hope to end this cycle of violence and secure peace for its people.