Asif Mahmood
Pakistan’s war against terrorism has exacted a staggering human and economic cost, yet the threat continues to evolve. The challenge today is not simply to eliminate individual terrorist groups through military operations. It is to dismantle the networks that sustain them, deny them safe havens, secure meaningful international cooperation and address the conditions that allow extremism to take root.
At a recent seminar on Pakistan’s evolving counterterrorism landscape in Islamabad, the Federal Information Minister cited figures that underline the scale of this struggle: Pakistan has lost more than 90,000 lives and suffered economic losses exceeding $100 billion in its decades-long fight against terrorism. These figures are a reminder that the consequences of terrorism extend far beyond the battlefield. They affect families, public finances, economic development and the confidence required for a society to move forward.
Yet the persistence of terrorism raises a fundamental question: why despite such a prolonged and costly campaign the threat has not yet completely eradicated?
One important part of the answer lies beyond Pakistan’s borders. Terrorist organisations do not necessarily operate within the geographical limits of the countries they target. They exploit porous borders, external sanctuaries, informal networks and political circumstances that allow them to organise, recruit, train and launch attacks. Pakistan’s security challenges have increasingly acquired this transnational character, making it difficult to address them through domestic measures alone.
The situation in Afghanistan is central to this problem. Following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, Pakistan expected that the Taliban authorities would prevent Afghan territory from being used by organisations threatening neighbouring countries. However, speakers at the Islamabad seminar argued that the commitments made by the Afghan Taliban, including those associated with the Doha Agreement, had not been honoured. They also pointed to the presence of more than 20 terrorist organisations operating from Afghanistan.
These are serious allegations with direct implications for regional security. Their significance lies in the gap between assurances and outcomes. Diplomatic commitments can provide a framework for cooperation, but they cannot substitute for verifiable action against terrorist infrastructure. If armed groups continue to find refuge, maintain their networks and plan attacks across borders, declarations of commitment to peace will remain insufficient.
Pakistan therefore has a legitimate security interest in demanding effective measures against groups operating from Afghan territory. This demand must be pursued through sustained diplomacy, intelligence cooperation and clearly defined expectations. The objective should be measurable progress: the disruption of terrorist networks, the prevention of cross-border attacks and an end to the use of one country’s territory against another.
The distinction between the threats confronting Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan also deserves attention. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army represent different security challenges, with distinct operational environments and dynamics. Treating them as interchangeable would obscure the specific requirements of counterterrorism policy. Yet both illustrate the importance of disrupting organisational networks, restricting access to weapons and resources, and preventing militants from exploiting cross-border movement.
Military operations remain necessary when the state faces armed groups that threaten its citizens and institutions. But the experience of prolonged conflict demonstrates why kinetic action cannot be the only instrument of policy. An operation may eliminate a militant commander or disrupt a particular network, but lasting security requires preventing that network from reconstituting itself. This demands capable institutions, reliable intelligence, effective law enforcement and coordination among the agencies responsible for national security.
It also requires attention to governance. Terrorist organisations exploit local grievances, weak administration, distrust of public institutions and the absence of credible avenues for peaceful political participation. These vulnerabilities do not justify violence, nor do they diminish the responsibility of those who organise terrorist attacks. They do, however, create openings that extremist groups can exploit for recruitment and influence.
A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy must therefore combine security operations with the rule of law, effective governance, political inclusion and public trust. The state must protect its citizens while ensuring that its institutions remain credible and accessible. Security cannot be sustained indefinitely through force alone if the underlying vulnerabilities remain unaddressed.
The technological dimension of terrorism makes this task more complicated. Digital platforms, encrypted communications and modern weaponry have expanded the means available to terrorist organisations. Their networks can communicate and adapt even when physical infrastructure comes under pressure. Counterterrorism institutions must consequently develop stronger intelligence capabilities, improve technological cooperation and respond to changing methods of recruitment and coordination.
Equally important is the battle of narratives. Terrorist groups seek to legitimise violence, exploit political discontent and attract recruits by presenting themselves as defenders of particular causes. Countering these messages requires more than official statements. It requires credible public communication, community engagement and a clear distinction between legitimate political expression and organised violence.
International cooperation is indispensable to all these efforts. Terrorist networks often operate across jurisdictions, while intelligence, financial trails, communications and logistical links may extend beyond the reach of any single state. Timely intelligence-sharing, technological assistance and coordinated diplomatic pressure can therefore make a tangible difference. International partners must recognise that Pakistan’s security concerns cannot be addressed adequately through expressions of sympathy alone.
The same principle applies to diplomacy with Afghanistan. Engagement remains necessary, but engagement should be judged by what it achieves. Meetings, agreements and public assurances have limited value unless they lead to practical measures against organisations responsible for violence. Credible commitments must be followed by implementation, and progress must be assessed against identifiable security outcomes.
There is also a wider regional stake. Persistent terrorism threatens trade, investment, economic connectivity and the prospects of cooperation among neighbouring states. Insecurity imposes additional costs on economies already struggling to create jobs and attract investment. No regional connectivity project can fulfil its promise if violence repeatedly undermines the stability on which it depends.
Pakistan must continue to strengthen its own institutions and counterterrorism capabilities, but it cannot be expected to carry the entire burden of a transnational threat. Nor can regional peace be built on the assumption that terrorist violence will remain confined to the country in which it originates. A threat allowed to operate from one territory can eventually undermine the security of others.
The lesson from Pakistan’s decades-long struggle is clear: terrorism cannot be defeated through military action alone, and diplomatic declarations cannot replace practical cooperation. A sustainable response requires domestic resilience, regional responsibility and international engagement, all directed towards the same objective.
After the loss of more than 90,000 lives and economic damage exceeding $100 billion, Pakistan has ample reason to demand that its sacrifices produce a more secure future. The measure of success will not be the number of conferences held, statements issued or commitments announced. It will be whether terrorist networks lose their capacity to operate, whether cross-border violence declines and whether ordinary citizens can live without the persistent fear of another attack.
That is the standard against which counterterrorism policy, both at home and across the region, must ultimately be judged.