By Sardar Khan Niazi

Diplomacy is often portrayed as a contest between adversaries sitting across a negotiating table. Yet the real challenge frequently lies elsewhere: persuading allies that compromise is preferable to confrontation. As Washington once again explores a diplomatic path with Tehran, the most difficult party to manage may not be Iran. It may be Israel. This is not because Israel lacks legitimate security concerns. Iran’s missile program, support for armed non-state actors and decades of hostile rhetoric have shaped Israeli strategic thinking. Any Israeli government, irrespective of its political complexion, would be expected to view an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. Those concerns are taken seriously by Israel. However, legitimate concerns do not automatically translate into identical policy preferences. The United States seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while avoiding another costly Middle Eastern war. Israel has often argued that diplomatic agreements merely delay the problem, providing Tehran with economic relief while allowing it to preserve elements of its nuclear infrastructure. This divergence in strategic outlook has repeatedly complicated negotiations. History offers ample evidence. During the negotiations that produced the 2015 nuclear agreement, opposition from Israel was not confined to private diplomacy. It became an unusually public campaign aimed at influencing American political opinion and Congress. Even after the agreement was concluded, Israeli leaders continued to argue that it legitimized rather than dismantled Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The subsequent US withdrawal from the accord reflected multiple domestic and strategic considerations, but Israeli objections remained an important part of the political environment surrounding the deal. Today’s negotiations face an even more difficult landscape. Regional tensions are higher, trust between Washington and Tehran is lower, and the military option appears closer than it has for years. Against this backdrop, any American administration pursuing diplomacy must reassure Israel that negotiations will enhance, rather than undermine, its security. That reassurance is easier promised than delivered. The challenge is compounded by domestic politics in both countries. In Washington, support for Israel enjoys broad bipartisan backing, even as debate over US Middle East policy has become more polarized. In Israel, coalition politics often reward leaders who project firmness towards Iran, leaving little political space for endorsing negotiated compromises. Consequently, even modest diplomatic concessions can become politically contentious on both sides of the alliance. None of this means Israel alone determines the fate of the talks. Iran’s own calculations remain decisive. Tehran continues to demand meaningful sanctions relief while insisting on preserving what it describes as its peaceful nuclear rights. Mutual distrust, verification mechanisms and sequencing of commitments remain formidable obstacles. A successful agreement requires flexibility from both Washington and Tehran. Yet the broader lesson remains. International negotiations rarely involve only the official participants. Regional allies, domestic constituencies and political opponents all become indirect stakeholders with the capacity to shape outcomes. Managing these parallel audiences is often as important as negotiating with the principal adversary. If diplomacy is to succeed, Washington must convince not only Tehran that an agreement serves its interests, but also Israel that a negotiated settlement offers greater security than perpetual escalation. That may prove to be the administration’s most delicate balancing act. The irony is that diplomacy is often judged by the concessions extracted from one’s adversary. In reality, its success frequently depends on reassuring one’s friends. In the current US-Iran negotiations, that may be the hardest task of all.