Asif Mahmood
Afghanistan is fully entitled to explore trade routes beyond Pakistan. No sovereign state can be denied the right to seek alternatives. Yet trade, at its core, is a calculation of profit and loss, and in this calculation Afghanistan gains little from shifting away from Pakistan while risking far greater economic harm. The Pakistan Afghanistan trade corridor is not just a geographic convenience but a natural economic pathway that has long served both sides. The share of benefit may not be equal, but both countries gain. If this route closes, losses will be felt on both ends, though the heavier burden will fall on Afghanistan.
Some ignore the longstanding misuse of Afghan transit facilities that has imposed losses on Pakistan far exceeding the benefits. If this factor is considered, Pakistan’s net loss in case of disruption is in fact smaller, and in some respects, it may even gain.
Afghanistan claims Pakistan frequently closes trade routes and that this uncertainty demands alternative options. Pakistan’s position is clear as well. If terrorism continues to spill over from across the border, how can trade routes remain reliably open? The situation is tense and peace talks have already collapsed. It is unlikely that the routes will reopen soon. Yet economic logic suggests that sooner or later this natural corridor must be restored, and that will only be possible once relations stabilise.
Healthy neighbourly relations open many doors, and the effort to achieve them should never cease. Ultimately, the only realistic path to solving regional problems is the cultivation of stable and cooperative ties. Afghanistan may eventually manage to secure alternative routes, but the real question is what profit margins its traders will be left with after long distances, higher transport costs, and limited banking access.
The difficulty is compounded by Afghanistan’s absence from the global banking system and the lack of international recognition for its government. These issues carry serious economic consequences. Pakistan, meanwhile, faces its own crises, especially a shortage of dollars. In such circumstances, both countries could benefit greatly from expanding bilateral trade, encouraging barter arrangements, settling payments in local currencies, and simplifying bureaucratic procedures.
Across Asia, trade takes place between countries whose currencies are not the dollar, yet transactions are still conducted in dollars. In some areas this may be necessary, but must it be the rule everywhere? Why can regional states not develop mechanisms for barter or local currency payments to reduce their dependence on the dollar where feasible?
Pakistan also serves as the largest transit route for Afghan imports, handling nearly sixty percent of their volume. Given this level of interdependence, is it not natural for both sides to sit together and explore the potential of deeper bilateral trade?

However, past negotiations faltered when Afghanistan insisted that India be included in trade talks. Turning a bilateral matter into a trilateral demand made progress difficult. Combined with the persistent threat of terrorism, a functional trade framework became nearly impossible.
If relations improve, both countries can benefit substantially. Take the example of coal. Pakistan imports roughly nineteen million tons of coal every year and buys close to ten thousand tons daily from Afghanistan. Seventy percent of Pakistan’s thermal coal traditionally comes from South Africa. To save foreign reserves, Pakistan decided to increase its coal imports from Afghanistan and settle payments in local currency. This arrangement naturally suited both countries, especially Afghanistan, which lacks access to global banking and diplomatic recognition.
Yet as soon as Pakistan announced this policy, Afghanistan significantly raised its coal prices, increasing them by roughly thirty percent within a single week.
For Pakistan, national security is the ultimate consideration. This is the case for every sovereign state. Economic opportunities cannot be pursued at the cost of national security. If such compromises were acceptable, Pakistan could also achieve major economic gains through trade with India, but national security remains the bottom line.
The same applies to Pakistan Afghanistan ties. Ideally, bilateral trade should expand and flourish. Both sides should benefit from each other’s resources and opportunities. But trade cannot be viewed in isolation. It is inseparable from the broader political and security environment. Unless relations improve and terrorism is curbed, trade will continue to face obstacles. This is an unavoidable and natural outcome of strained relations.