Asif Mahmood
The process of negotiations between the United States and Iran is about to begin in Islamabad. The question is, what are the chances of success?
No formal document has surfaced, yet the positions emerging through the media can broadly be divided into two parts. Most issues fall in the category where some level of agreement is possible, or at least where, even in the absence of full consensus, a middle ground can be crafted to provide face saving for both sides. There are, however, certain aspects where agreement appears out of reach and no workable middle path is visible. Some of these may not carry the same weight for the United States, yet for its allies in the Arab world, they may well be the most critical.
The basic point is this. In negotiations, every demand is neither meant to be accepted nor even presented for acceptance. Only a few points at the bottom line carry decisive weight in determining success or failure. Some demands are placed merely to set the record straight, to exist as reference when needed. Others are introduced precisely so they can be rejected, allowing the other side the space to say no. Negotiation is an exercise in give and take. It is neither about taking everything nor about giving everything.
Let us now try to understand the present situation.
Progress on Iran’s nuclear program is possible. Iran has already stated that it has no intention of building a nuclear bomb, and that its Supreme Leader has declared such weapons inhumane and prohibited them. Iran speaks of peaceful nuclear capability. The United States insists that uranium enrichment be limited to a level where the possibility of nuclear weapons does not arise. There is, in principle, an overlap here. Enough, at least, for both sides to find face saving. The disagreement lies in the details. The American claim that it would itself extract uranium from the ground is clearly not practical. Had it been possible, it would have already been done. A middle path could be to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency greater operational space so that it can continue to monitor these matters.
The issue of the Strait of Hormuz can also be resolved without much difficulty. Iran has already reopened it following the ceasefire. If a lasting ceasefire holds, it will remain open. Under international law, it falls within Iran’s domain and is likely to remain so. The United States may continue to speak and apply pressure, yet in practical terms it will remain with Iran. If control could not be secured through war, expecting Iran to concede ownership or partnership at the negotiating table is unrealistic. Washington knows this. Had it been able to take control, it would have done so already instead of turning to negotiations.
Iran is demanding compensation for war damage. The United States will not accept this in direct terms. Yet a middle way exists, and even Trump has hinted at it under the label of reconstruction. A fund in the name of peace and rebuilding in the Middle East could be created, with a portion quietly directed toward Iran’s reconstruction, allowing both sides to settle the matter without confrontation.
Iran also demands the lifting of sanctions and the restoration of its frozen assets worth billions. This demand can be addressed with conditions attached, or even partially without conditions. Even if it is not accepted immediately, it is unlikely to cause the collapse of negotiations.
Iran has also called for the removal of American bases from the region. This demand is not practical. These bases exist in sovereign countries. It is a matter between those states and the United States, not Iran. This demand serves more as a statement for the record. Its rejection will not affect the overall health of the negotiations.
Similarly, the United States is asking Iran to end its regional proxies. This is a significant point. Hezbollah and the Houthis are central to Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy. Iran is not going to disown them. Nor is the United States likely to push this demand to a point where the entire negotiation process is put at risk.
Yet this remains perhaps the oldest and most serious demand of America’s Arab allies. Iran’s resistance is acknowledged and even admired, but it is also a fact that since the Iranian Revolution, Tehran has expanded its influence through these proxies in a way that has unsettled the Arab world and deepened divisions within the Muslim world.
The chances of success in these negotiations appear, on the face of it, to be strong. There are reasons for this.
The first is that both the United States and Iran want a way out of the present situation. If the United States could have won the war, or was winning it, it would not have turned to negotiations. The international community is not aligned with it. Its supported resolution has been vetoed. It has not been able to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Its allies are also under pressure, their economies strained by this American misadventure. Washington now needs face saving.
Iran, on the other hand, has shown strong resistance and defended itself, yet this war was not its choice. It was imposed upon it. It has no interest in prolonging it unnecessarily. It has suffered considerable damage. A ceasefire and peace are now its need as well.
There is, however, one troubling development. At the very moment when negotiations are about to begin, Israel has launched an attack on Lebanon. It is difficult to believe that Netanyahu is acting entirely on his own. It appears to carry American approval and backing. The recent statement by US Vice President JD Vance reinforces this concern. He has said that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire. This places Iran in a difficult position. It cannot detach itself from Lebanon and Hezbollah while engaging in peace talks. The situation is no different from one where Israel comes under attack and the United States chooses to remain detached while continuing negotiations. That simply does not happen.
Pakistan has worked hard, gathering each piece with care, to build this structure of negotiations. It must not be allowed to fall apart.