By Sardar Khan Niazi

The world does not need another closed maritime chokepoint. Yet that is precisely the danger now emerging around Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, through the Suez Canal, one of the principal arteries linking Asia with Europe. Recent Houthi advances along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the capture of strategically important islands near the strait, have brought the question of maritime access back to the center of the regional crisis. For Pakistan, this should not be treated as a distant geopolitical story. Pakistan is heavily exposed to international energy prices and imported inputs. Any prolonged disruption in shipping would raise the cost of transporting goods, while higher oil prices would put further pressure on the import bill, inflation and the rupee. Exporters could also face higher freight and insurance costs at precisely the moment when competitiveness matters most. There is a second danger: complacency. The experience of the Red Sea crisis since 2023 demonstrated that shipping companies can change routes well before a waterway is physically closed. Security concerns alone can make a corridor commercially unattractive. The result is effectively a reduction in capacity, even when ships continue to sail through the waterway. That is why the international response should not be limited to naval deployments. The central objective must be to prevent a permanent militarization of one of the world’s most important commercial passages. Maritime security is necessary, but security without diplomacy can become an endless cycle of escalation. Recent US-Houthi contacts facilitated through Oman reportedly focused, among other things, on preserving freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.  U.S. diplomats held a weekend meeting with Houthi representatives at the U.S. embassy in Oman amidst escalating tensions in the Red Sea. The discussions, facilitated by the Omani government, aimed to uphold a ceasefire between the U.S. and the Houthis and ensure the Bab al-Mandeb Strait remains open for navigation. While the U.S. ambassador did not attend, embassy diplomats represented the American side. The U.S. State Department emphasized its commitment to safeguarding maritime freedom and countering terrorism threats posed by Iran and its allies. Following the meeting, Vice President Vance confirmed ongoing negotiations with the Houthis. Additionally, Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi regarding regional de-escalation efforts. Meanwhile, hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have intensified, including a drone strike attempt on Mecca and missile attacks on other Saudi cities. The crisis also exposes the danger of treating Yemen merely as another arena in a larger regional confrontation. The more actors view the country through the prism of Iran-Saudi or US-Iran rivalry, the harder it becomes to separate Yemen’s internal conflict from the security of international commerce. A sustainable solution therefore requires diplomacy alongside deterrence: negotiations involving Yemen’s principal actors, pressure on all sides to protect commercial shipping, and a broader regional arrangement aimed at keeping strategic waterways open. Pakistan has an interest in making that argument forcefully. Islamabad should coordinate closely with Gulf states, Egypt, Oman and other countries whose economies depend directly on uninterrupted maritime commerce. It should also prepare for the economic consequences of prolonged disruption rather than waiting for another price shock to expose weaknesses in energy planning. The lesson from recent crises is straightforward: geographical distance does not provide economic insulation. Bab al-Mandeb may be only a narrow strip of water, but its significance extends from Yemen to the Suez Canal, from Asian factories to European consumers, and from global oil markets to Pakistani households. The strait does not have to be formally closed for the world to pay a heavy price. If ships begin avoiding it in sufficient numbers, the economic effect can arrive long before the legal or military definition of a “closure” is reached. That is why preventing disruption at Bab al-Mandeb should now be treated as an international economic priority, not merely another chapter in the Middle East’s security crisis.