By Sardar Khan Niazi

For decades, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) symbolized everything that could go wrong with state-owned enterprises: political interference, bloated payrolls, mounting losses, and a collective resignation to failure. Governments came and went and privatization remained a word spoken cautiously. The assumption was simple; PIA was too politically sensitive, too unionized, and too symbolic to touch. With the privatization of PIA, a long-standing misfortune appears to have been broken. This moment matters not because a loss-making airline has exited the public sector, but because it signals a shift — however tentative — in how the state views its role in commercial enterprise. For the first time in years, the government has followed through on a politically difficult economic decision rather than deferring it to the next administration. In a country where reform fatigue is real and credibility is scarce, that alone is noteworthy. PIA once a regional aviation leader, trained staff for foreign airlines and helped launch carriers across Asia and the Middle East. Its fall was the product of poor governance: appointments based on loyalty rather than competence, procurement decisions shaped by rent seeking, and an inability to align costs with revenues. Taxpayers underwrote these failures year after year, even as service quality deteriorated and safety concerns mounted. Money used to keep PIA afloat was money not spent on health, education, or climate resilience. Breaking the misfortune does not automatically mean success. Privatization is a tool, not a cure-all. Much depends on what follows. If the process results merely in the transfer of a public monopoly into private hands without competition, transparency, or regulatory capacity, the gains will be limited. Worse, public skepticism already high will harden into cynicism. The immediate concerns are predictable and legitimate. What happens to employees? Can routes to less profitable destinations be maintained, safety and service standards be enforced effectively? These questions cannot be waved away with market rhetoric. They require a strong, competent regulator and a state willing to enforce rules even when powerful private interests are involved — something Pakistan has historically struggled to do. At the same time, it is important to recognize what privatization can realistically achieve. A privately run airline, operating under commercial incentives, is more likely to control costs, invest in fleet renewal, and respond to passengers rather than political patrons. It may not become a national symbol in the old sense, but it could become a functional airline. More broadly, PIA’s privatization sets a precedent. Pakistan’s public sector is crowded with enterprises that drain the exchequer while delivering little value. From power distribution companies to railways and manufacturing units, the pattern is familiar. If PIA arguably the most emotive and politically charged of them all could be privatized, then the argument that other entities are too difficult loses much of its force. That does not mean a rush to sell everything. Strategic assets, natural monopolies, and public goods require careful handling. However, it does mean that blanket resistance to private ownership is no longer tenable. The debate should shift from ideology to evidence: what works, under what conditions, and with what safeguards. For the government, the real test lies ahead. Privatization must not become a one-off trophy used to claim reformist credentials while deeper structural problems remain untouched. Fiscal discipline, civil service reform, and regulatory strengthening are harder, slower, and less headline-friendly — but without them, no privatization can deliver durable benefits. The curse around PIA has been broken. Whether this becomes the start of a broader reform cycle or remains, an isolated episode will depend on political will. Pakistan has taken a step many thought it never would. The challenge now is to ensure it was a step forward, not merely a step taken.