By Sardar Khan Niazi

After years of icy standoffs and diplomatic posturing, India and China appear to be recalibrating their bilateral relationship. The optics of dialogue have returned. There are handshakes again, cautious smiles, and references to mutual respect. However, behind this public diplomacy lies a more complex calculation–especially on India’s part. Far from being driven by goodwill or trust, New Delhi’s overtures toward Beijing are rooted in strategic necessity, economic pragmatism, and geopolitical realignment. India’s relationship with China nosedived after the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, which left 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers dead. Since then, both nations have engaged in multiple rounds of military-level talks and limited disengagements, but mutual suspicion has lingered. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains volatile, and Chinese infrastructure development in contested zones continues unabated. So why is India seeking a reset now? First is strategic bandwidth and domestic pressures. First, India’s strategic bandwidth is stretched. With tensions brewing on its western border with Pakistan and persistent insurgencies in the Northeast, India cannot afford a two-front challenge. As China deepens its influence in South Asia–strengthening ties with Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives–India finds itself needing to de-escalate one front to focus on its more traditional theatre of conflict. In other words, New Delhi is buying time and space. Moreover, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, fresh from securing a third term but with a reduced majority, is now more beholden to domestic economic performance. With slowing growth, high unemployment, and foreign investment teetering, regional instability serves no one–least of all India. Second are economic imperatives. Despite nationalist rhetoric and calls for Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India), economic decoupling from China has proved more aspirational than real. Trade between the two nations hit a record $136 billion in 2023, with India’s deficit standing at a staggering $100 billion. Chinese components remain vital to Indian industries, especially electronics, telecom, and pharmaceuticals. Efforts to diversify supply chains to countries like Vietnam or Mexico are in progress but far from complete. Indian businesses are pushing back against government restrictions on Chinese imports and investments. In this context, a thaw in ties with Beijing is as much about economic self-preservation as it is about diplomacy. Third is global diplomatic positioning. India’s ambition to emerge, as a key global player–through forums like BRICS, the G20, and the Quad–requires managing, not escalating, its major rivalries. While New Delhi has deteriorated ties with the U.S. and its allies, it cannot afford to alienate Beijing fully, especially as China expands its presence in the Global South. The recent BRICS summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings offered India opportunities to appear as a mature, responsible power. Repairing ties with China–at least superficially–suits this image. Fourth is China’s calculations. It is important to note that Beijing, too, sees value in easing tensions with India, especially as it confronts growing Western pressure and an economic slowdown at home. However, India’s real motivation is not peace for peace’s sake—it is advantage. By reducing friction, India hopes to secure a more favorable environment for negotiation on both border and trade issues. The goal is not to trust China, but to manage it. The rekindling of India-China diplomacy is not a sign of warmth but of realism. India is engaging with China not because it has forgotten Galwan, but because it cannot afford another confrontation–not economically, politically, or strategically. The calculus is clear: keep your rivals close, but your biggest one even closer. For India, the thaw with China is less a pivot and more a pause–a necessary breather in a game that is far from over.