“The return of Crimea to Ukraine, of which it is an integral part, is basically required under international law.” Anyone who frequently monitors relations between Turkey and Russia would not have been surprised by TurkishPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s startling remark, made via video link at the Crimea Platform Summit last month.
However, it was proof of more than just Erdogan’s difficult juggling act between his support for the independence of Ukraine and his rejection of joining the sanctions on Russia.
It was a hint at potential chances for Turkey to advance its relations with Russia at a time when the Kremlin is mired in the Ukraine conflict.
Ankara is getting ready to fill the gap as Moscow’s power appears to be on the decline, whether in Syria or the South Caucasus.
Turkey has acted as a middleman following Russia’s actions against Ukraine, as seen by the agreement it negotiated in July with assistance from the UN to allow Ukrainian grain ships to depart from Odesa. Its business links to Russia are flourishing.
Erdogan, meanwhile, has consistently supported Kiev, even in Crimea, the traditional homeland of Crimean Tatars (a community that sees Turkey as a kin state).
The most potent representation of Ankara’s military assistance to Kiev continues to be the delivery of Bayraktar drones to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Since the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Turkey has felt threatened by Russian encroachment into the Black Sea. Moscow has gradually taken control of the buffer states whose development in the early 1990s had allowed for a previously unheard-of reconciliation between Turkey and Russia.
Ankara prefers to reach an understanding with its massive, imperialist-minded neighbour rather than engage in combat due to its own sense of vulnerability and a deep-seated mistrust of Western friends.
But at the same time, Turkey has developed ties with other Black Sea nations like Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania, and Moldova that are wary of Russian revanchism.
