For over twenty years, Pakistan has been banning militant groups, yet this has not significantly reduced militant activities, except for short periods of calm. Recently, two more groups were added to Nacta’s list of banned organizations: the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, which has ties to the TTP, and the Baloch separatist Majeed Brigade. The state also referred to the proscribed TTP as ‘Fitna al Khawarij,’ likening them to a rebellious group from early Islamic history. However, beyond issuing bans and using historical references to discredit these groups, there needs to be a deeper investigation into why the state’s efforts to outlaw such organizations have not been more effective.
Religiously motivated militant groups have their roots in the Afghan ‘jihad’ era under Zia, while nationalist militant groups, particularly in Balochistan, have existed even longer. The sectarian terrorist group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was banned in 2001 by then-President Musharraf, who subsequently banned five more groups in 2002. This action was largely seen as a move to align with the United States following the ‘with us or against us’ stance post-9/11. Although this led to some action against jihadist and sectarian groups, the list of proscribed outfits has expanded to 81, encompassing a variety of religious militants, separatists, and even NGOs. This raises critical questions: Why does the list keep growing, and why does militancy persist?
It seems the state’s strategy for banning these groups has been flawed. Many groups simply rebranded and continued their activities after the initial bans in 2002. In some cases, their assets were not frozen, and key leaders remained at large. Even today, some sectarian groups continue to operate under different names with relative freedom.
To effectively counter the militant threat, only state representatives, such as the military and civil armed forces, should be authorized to carry arms. Additionally, the masterminds and ideologues behind terrorist groups should be legally prosecuted, and all funding sources should be cut off. A broader effort to counter groups promoting extremist ideologies is also essential.
Furthermore, the underlying issues that drive ordinary citizens toward terrorism—such as injustice, poverty, and lack of opportunities—must be addressed. In 2002, it was anticipated that these bans would improve the law and order situation and lead to socio-economic stability. However, twenty-two years later, this hoped-for stability remains elusive.
